Reasoning in Games

Instructor: Eric Pacuit (website)

ESSLLI 2015 • Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain

August 5 - 10, 2015

9am - 10:30am

Day 1: Decision Theory

I introduced the basics of decision theory: Decision problems, strict/weak dominance, expected utility, minmax regret, ordinal/cardinal utilities. We discussed the von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem and Newcomb's paradox. We concluded with a brief discussion of ratifiability (focusing on the Death in Damascus problem).

Background Reading

Day 2: From Decisions to Games

This lecture introduced the basic concepts of game theory (e.g., strategic and extensive games, Nash equilibrium, iterated strict/weak dominance, rationalizability).

Background Reading

  • K.R. Apt (2011). A Primer on Strategic Games, in Lectures in Game Theory for Computer Scientists, Cambridge University Press, pgs. 1 - 33.
  • Online game theory course by Kevin Leyton-Brown, Matthew Jackson and Yoav Shoham (the website contains a link to a youtube channel containing the video lectures from the course).

Day 3: Game Models

The lecture introduced epistemic models of games. We discussed epistemic characterizations of Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, iterated strict/weak dominance.

Background Reading

  • EP and O. Roy, Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2015
  • A. Perea, Epistemic Game Theory: Reasoning and Choice, Cambridge University Press, 2012

Day 4: Deliberation (in Games)

This lecture introduced Brian Skyrms' model of deliberation in games. We discussed a number of extensions of the model. We also briefly discussed how to incorporate belief revision in game models.

Background Reading

Day 5: Backward and Forward Induction, Concluding Remarks

The main part of the lecture focused on epistemic issues that arise when characterizing forward and backward induction on extensive games. I ended with a few concluding remarks.

Backward Induction