Doxastic Logic, Probability and Default Logic

Course Information
  • Lectures: Eric Pacuit (website) and Aleks Knoks (website)
  • Venue: University of Ljubljana, Solvenia


  • Dates: TBA
  • Meeting Times: TBA
  • Logicians, philosophers, and artificial intelligence researchers interested in epistemic questions---or, roughly, questions relating to belief, knowledge, and reasoning---have developed formal models to refine these questions and to answer them. This course will introduce three of the most prominent such formal models: doxastic logic, Bayesian models, and default logic. We will introduce these models, highlighting their similarities and differences, as well as their advantages and pitfalls. The course will touch on the fundamental questions driving much of the research in formal epistemology. In addition to presenting the different models, we will discuss such issues as the lottery and preface paradoxes, doxastic paradoxes, the source of epistemic normativity, and puzzles associated with higher-order evidence and peer disagreement. Topics that will be discussed include:

    • Modal logics of belief (with propositional quantifiers)
    • Bayesian epistemology, accuracy arguments for probabilism
    • The Buridan-Burge Paradox
    • Lottery and Preface Paradox
    • Reflection Principles
    • Default logic
    • Applications of default logic in the context of the peer disagreement debate; debates about the nature of (epistemic) authority, expertise, and deference

Day 1    Doxastic Logic
  • Slides
Day 2    Probability I
  • Slides
Day 3    Probability II
  • Slides
Day 4    Default logic I
  • Slides
Day 5    Default logic II
  • Slides