Slides
I introduced the basics of decision theory: Decision problems, strict/weak dominance, expected utility, minmax regret, ordinal/cardinal utilities. We discussed the von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem and Newcomb's paradox. We concluded with a brief discussion of ratifiability (focusing on the Death in Damascus problem).
Background Reading
Slides
This lecture introduced the basic concepts of game theory (e.g., strategic and extensive games, Nash equilibrium, iterated strict/weak dominance, rationalizability).
Background Reading
Slides
The lecture introduced epistemic models of games. We discussed epistemic characterizations of Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, iterated strict/weak dominance.
Background Reading
Slides
This lecture introduced Brian Skyrms' model of deliberation in games. We discussed a number of extensions of the model. We also briefly discussed how to incorporate belief revision in game models.
Background Reading
Slides
The main part of the lecture focused on epistemic issues that arise when characterizing forward and backward induction on extensive games. I ended with a few concluding remarks.
Backward Induction